En tan solo cuatro años, la reforma educativa logró lo que las anteriores no pudieron: modificar drásticamente los mecanismos de ingreso, promoción y permanencia en el servicio docente. En este artículo se rastrean los efectos subjetivos que la reforma, y particularmente la evaluación docente obligatoria, permanente y cambiante, están teniendo en el perfil profesional y la composición de la planta docente en la escuela. El supuesto que guía nuestra pesquisa, es que en tanto dispositivo de reconfiguración del sistema educativo, la (...) reforma busca desaparecer todo vestigio del maestro misionero, apóstol, agente de cambio y burócrata sindicalizado, para configurar un maestro multifuncional, flexible, precario, responsable tanto de sus propios éxitos como de sus fracasos. En suma, un empresario de sí mismo. Palabras clave: reforma educativa, evaluación docente, dispositivos y tecnologías de poder, subjetivación política. (shrink)

The sexual double standard refers to the acceptance of different criteria to assess the same sexual behavior in men and women. To date, the few studies that have addressed the relationship between SDS and sexual satisfaction have obtained inconclusive results. In addition, no study has analyzed sexual satisfaction in people who maintain different forms of adherence to the SDS. This study establishes three SDS typologies of adherence in two areas of sexual behavior to examine the predictive capacity of personal variables, (...) interpersonal variables and social variables in sexual satisfaction. A sample of 1194 heterosexual adults aged between 18 and 87 years, who had been in a relationship for more than 6 months, was evaluated. In men, the highest sexual satisfaction levels were obtained in the egalitarian typology in the sexual freedom area. In women, no significant differences were found between the typologies of adherence to the SDS. Regression models showed that relationship satisfaction was the main predictor of sexual satisfaction in all the typologies in both men and women. In addition, the predictive relationship of personal variables with sexual satisfaction varied according to gender and the SDS adherence type. The results show the importance of studying sexual satisfaction by taking into account not only the differences between men and women. Furthermore, it is essential to consider other differences between people; for example, the difference that derives from the way of psychologically internalizing attitude toward the SDS. (shrink)

IntroductionThe COVID-19 pandemic has forced changes in patient care in Mental Health Day Hospitals.ObjectivesTo study the interventions performed in MHDHs during the pandemic in comparison with those performed in other facilities and to analyze the new hospital admissions in both groups.MethodA retrospective multicenter cohort study comparing the interventions received by a group of 161 patients admitted in MHDHs during the lockdown period in Spain with the interventions of another group of 109 patients who were treated at other facilities during lockdown.ResultsMHDHs (...) reduced their face-to-face interventions during lockdown just as much as other facilities but implemented telematic intervention methods to a greater extent. Patients attached to MHDHs during lockdown were admitted significantly less and presented fewer urgent consultations in the following 6 months.ConclusionThe use of telepsychiatry made it feasible to adapt MHDHs to periods of lockdown, being useful to improve the continuity of care during the pandemic. In addition, it was possible to maintain a reduction in hospital admissions in patients treated at MHDHs. (shrink)

Peroxisomal matrix proteins are synthesized on cytosolic ribosomes and rapidly transported into the organelle by a complex machinery. The data gathered in recent years suggest that this machinery operates through a syringe-like mechanism, in which the shuttling receptor PEX5 − the “plunger” − pushes a newly synthesized protein all the way through a peroxisomal transmembrane protein complex − the “barrel” − into the matrix of the organelle. Notably, insertion of cargo-loaded receptor into the “barrel” is an ATP-independent process, whereas extraction (...) of the receptor back into the cytosol requires its monoubiquitination and the action of ATP-dependent mechanoenzymes. Here, we review the main data behind this model. The peroxin PEX5 is the peroxisomal matrix protein receptor. It shuttles between the cytosol and the organelle membrane, where it gets inserted into the docking/translocation module, thus pushing the cargo-protein into the peroxisome lumen. Resetting the system involves PEX5 monoubiquitination and its extraction from the membrane by the AAA-ATPases, PEX1/PEX6. (shrink)

No seu livro de 1998 — What we owe to each other — T. M. Scanlon defendeu sistematicamente que a noção de “razão” é primitiva e não definível noutros termos quando se trata de explicar um curso de acção moralmente relevante. Suportando o seu argumento num modelo muito intuitivo para pensar o que são razões em termos de racionalidade prática, Scanlon defende que qualquer explicação conduz sempre à mesma ideia: uma razão é uma consideração que conta em favor de algo. (...) E conta como tal na medida em que fornece uma razão para aquilo que justifica, explica ou legitima. Parece, portanto, que este é o limite da definição. O meu argumento neste trabalho confronta a posição hiper-racionalista de Scanlon com o exemplo da Acrasia ou fraqueza da vontade, por se tratar de um típico curso de acção que não apenas seria erradamente caracterizado com racional, mas onde o próprio agente falharia sistematicamente na provisão de razões para o seu comportamento. (shrink)

Group polarization—roughly, the tendency of groups to incline towards more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members— has been rigorously studied by social psychol- ogists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions about this phenomenon which remain unexplored. Two such salient questions are metaphysical and epistemological, respectively. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an (...) epistemological point of view, is group polarization best understood as a kind of cognitive bias or rather in terms of intellectual vice? This book taxonomizes this possibility space by comparing four models which combine potential answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions. The models we consider are: group polarization as a collective bias, a summation of individual epistemic vices; a summation of individual biases; and a collective epistemic vice. We defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives. (shrink)

Winning a lottery, being hit by a stray bullet, or surviving a plane crash, all are instances of a mundane phenomenon: luck. Mundane as it is, the concept of luck nonetheless plays a pivotal role in central areas of philosophy, either because it is the key element of widespread philosophical theses or because it … Continue reading Luck →.

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing (...) party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone abordar la obra de Adam Smith con el objeto de identificar una posible “teoría sobre la igualdad” en el corpus del filósofo escocés. Nuestro planteamiento cuestiona el ideario colectivo en torno a este autor, según el cual se lo caracteriza como cercano al anti-igualitarismo de ciertas corrientes liberales. Basándonos en investigaciones hechas en los últimos años por algunos estudiosos de Smith, expondremos argumentos e ideas presentes en su obra que se pueden asociar a posiciones igualitaristas (...) y que muestran que su postura sobre este tema es más compleja de lo que se cree. En esta línea, con el fin de evidenciar la posición de Smith acerca de la igualdad, presentaremos su concepción sobre el surgimiento de la desigualdad y ciertas ideas plasmadas en La Riqueza de las Naciones y en Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales relevantes para la discusión. En esta tarea, tomaremos como principal referente el trabajo de Samuel Fleischacker, cuya interpretación de Smith -que será complementada con análisis propios- tenemos también el objeto de difundir. (shrink)

A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology—the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues—is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the (...) problem of eliminating luck—this makes their views instances of impure virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is to argue, firstly, that such a move lacks adequate motivation; secondly, that the resulting impure accounts equally fail to handle knowledge-undermining luck. On a more positive note, these results bolster a more orthodox virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge that assigns a fundamental explanatory role to the notion of ability. In this sense, the paper also sketches an account of ability and a corresponding account of knowledge that explains how success from ability is incompatible with success from luck. (shrink)

El presente artículo comienza reconstruyendo la recepción textual y el interés por Maquiavelo a cargo de Antonio Gramsci. A continuación, las dos partes que componen el trabajo buscan ofrecer una exposición del modo, originalidad y consecuencias según las cuales Gramsci interpreta a Maquiavelo, por un lado, en su especificidad histórica, y, por otro, como un teórico político que ofrece aplicaciones tácticas y estratégicas. A través de diversos temas, como la formación del Estado-nación, el precoz jacobinismo de Maquiavelo, la relación entre (...) clase dirigente y masas o las consideraciones sobre la constitución económica de la URSS, mostramos las formas en que Maquiavelo aparece en la obra de Gramsci, qué significa la presencia de florentino en diferentes momentos de la misma y cómo dialoga con el resto del universo conceptual gramsciano. (shrink)

What is the nature of knowledge? A popular answer to that long-standing question comes from robust virtue epistemology, whose key idea is that knowing is just a matter of succeeding cognitively—i.e., coming to believe a proposition truly—due to an exercise of cognitive ability. Versions of robust virtue epistemology further developing and systematizing this idea offer different accounts of the relation that must hold between an agent’s cognitive success and the exercise of her cognitive abilities as well as of the very (...) nature of those abilities. This paper aims to give a new robust virtue epistemological account of knowledge based on a different understanding of the nature and structure of the kind of abilities that give rise to knowledge. (shrink)

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...) ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so-called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck. (shrink)

In “Knowledge Under Threat” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2012), Tomas Bogardus proposes a counterexample to the safety condition for knowledge. Bogardus argues that the case demonstrates that unsafe knowledge is possible. I argue that the case just corroborates the well-known requirement that modal conditions like safety must be relativized to methods of belief formation. I explore several ways of relativizing safety to belief-forming methods and I argue that none is adequate: if methods were individuated in those ways, safety would fail (...) to explain several much-discussed cases. I then propose a plausible externalist principle of method individuation. On the one hand, relativizing safety to belief-forming methods in the way suggested allows the defender of safety to account for the cases. On the other hand, it shows that the target known belief of Bogardus’s example is safe. Finally, I offer a diagnosis of a common error about the kind of cases that are typically considered potential counterexamples to the necessity of the epistemic condition: proponents of the alleged counterexamples mistake a strong condition that I call super-safety for safety. (shrink)

Previous research suggests a strong association of health indicators with self-report ability emotional intelligence and self-report mixed EI, but a weak or moderate association with performance-based ability EI measures. The size of the association for ability EI may be inaccurately estimated, because there has not been enough research on the relationship of ability EI to health outcomes to allow moderator analyses in meta-analyses. Therefore the present review aimed to synthesize results specifically from studies on the relationship of performance-based ability EI (...) with depression and well-being across adult populations in different settings. We found that maximum-performance measures of ability EI are associated negatively with depression and positively with well-being, and that these associations are moderated and mediated by several factors, including gender and self-report EI. Our analysis highlights limitations in the evidence base and leads to recommendations for future research and for ability EI-based training programs. (shrink)

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...) ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so-called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck. (shrink)

Resumen A partir de la Ilustración, la ciencia y la fe ―otrora caminos comunes para alcanzar conocimiento―, se han visto divorciadas y constituidas como realidades divergentes que se oponen cada vez más. La modernidad trajo consigo la insistencia en estas ideas y el divorcio entre ciencia y fe parece no detenerse. El presente artículo propone en un dialogo con John Henry Newman reconocer el lugar propio de la ciencia positiva respecto de la fe religiosa, presentando la distinción epistemológica, o el (...) modo de comprender el conocimiento que hace de la fe un camino plausible y posible que tiene su propia estructura epistémica dirigida hacia la credibilidad de la fe religiosa.Since the Enlightenment, science and faith -once common ways to achieve knowledge- have been divorced and incorporated as divergent realities that increasingly oppose. Modernity brought with it the insistence on these ideas and the divorce of science and faith does not seem to stop. The present article proposes in a dialogue with John Henry Newman to recognize the proper place of positive science regarding religious faith, presenting the epistemological distinction, or the way of understanding the knowledge that makes of faith a plausible and possible path that has its Own epistemic structure directed towards the credibility of religious faith. (shrink)

Resumen La movilidad humana es un fenómeno social que ha puesto en la sensibilidad pública nacional una serie de inquietudes, que han derivado en definiciones normativas desde la política pública. Tras decisiones de orden administrativo, emergen convicciones sociales y culturales que tienden a relativizar, y en otros casos estigmatizar ciertas realidades migratorias subjetivamente evaluadas. En este contexto el aporte que podemos reconocer desde una reflexión teológica, contribuye a ampliar la mirada y reorientar aquellas convicciones previas que se ven ilumina das (...) desde otra epistemología. El presente artículo busca poner el desafío de acoger la movilidad humana en perspectiva teológico fundamental y reconocer allí la integración de un fenómeno que interpela hoy nuestra realidad nacional.Human mobility is a social phenomenon that has put a series of concerns in the national public sensibility, which have resulted in normative definitions from public policy. After administrative decisions, social and cultural convictions emerge that tend to relativize, and in other cases stigmatize certain subjectively evaluated migration realities. In this context, the contribution that we can recognize from a theological reflection, helps to broaden the look and redirect those previous convictions that are illuminated from another epistemology. This article seeks to put the challenge of welcoming human mobility in a fundamental theological perspective and to recognize the integration of a phenomenon that challenges our national reality today. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the volume The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, forthcoming), (eds.) F. Broncano-Berrocal and J.A. Carter.

An explanatorily powerful approach to the modal dimension of knowledge is Robert Nozick’s idea that knowledge stands in a tracking relation to the world. However, pinning down a specific modal condition has proved elusive. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis and a positive proposal. The root of the problem, I argue, is the unquestioned assumption that tracking is a matter of directly preserving conformity between what is believed and what is the case in certain possible worlds. My proposal is (...) that what we track is whether the conditions for belief formation are appropriate in such worlds. Accordingly, we indirectly track the truth by ensuring that we only use our methods of belief formation in conditions that make it likely that conformity is preserved between what is believed and what is the case. (shrink)

The main lesson from Gettier cases is that while one cannot know a proposition by luck, one can hold a lucky true belief justifiedly. Possibly because the latter is taken for granted, the relationship between epistemic justification and epistemic luck has been less discussed. The paper investigates whether luck can undermine doxastic justification, and if so, how and to what extent. It is argued that, as in the case of knowledge, beliefs can fall short of justification due to luck. Moreover, (...) it is argued that justification-undermining luck is a problem for both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. Accordingly, it is shown that epistemic luck is a more widespread phenomenon than many in epistemology commonly assume. (shrink)

The traditional view of lying says that lying is a matter of intending to deceive others by making statements that one believes to be false. Jennifer Lackey has recently defended the following version of the traditional view: A lies to B just in case (i) A states that p to B, (ii) A believes that p is false and (iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p. I argue that, despite all the virtues that Lackey ascribes (...) to her view, conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are not sufficient for lying. (shrink)

In what sense do groups have beliefs? This paper provides a novel answer to this question by combining pluralism and summativism about group belief. The resulting view is called pluralistic summativism. The paper starts by critically assessing the three main debates in the literature—the disputes between monism and pluralism, summativism and non-summativism, and believism and rejectionism—and draws a general methodological lesson for the summativism/non-summativism debate—namely, that intuitions about cases alone are not enough to adjudicate between views of group belief, and (...) that the debate would benefit from a reflective equilibrium approach. All of this serves as motivation for the novel pluralist and summative view, which has some advantages, for example, when it comes to moral evaluation. (shrink)

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows (...) that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge. (shrink)

Este artículo reconstruye algunas líneas fundamentales que componen el programa filosófico-político del ordoliberalismo y su impacto en el proceso de integración europea. En él, se analizan las consecuencias éticas y políticas de las ideas ordoliberales relativas al papel del Estado y la función del mercado a través de sus figuras y nociones claves. Además, se elabora un diagnóstico de la matriz ordoliberal que inspira la política de la Unión Europea desde la perspectiva de un nuevo constitucionalismo disciplinario cuyo objetivo es (...) desvincular las políticas nacionales del control democrático y social mediante su atribución a marcos jurídicos de carácter supranacionales. (shrink)

In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence, but of course, not always. Epistemic (...) luck is a species of luck which features in circumstances where a given cognitive success—in the broadest sense, some form of cognitive contact with reality—is attained in a manner that is interestingly lucky—viz., chancy, accidental or beyond our control. In the paradigmatic case, this involves the formation of a belief that is luckily true, and where the subject plausibly deserves little credit for having gotten things right. Although the literature on epistemic luck has focused predominantly on the relationship between luck and propositional knowledge—which is widely taken to exclude luck—epistemologists are increasingly exploring the compatibility of epistemic luck with other kinds of epistemic standings, such as knowledge-how and understanding. (shrink)

I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem.

In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability (robust virtue epistemology) is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent’s true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency (epistemic dependence). In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents’ cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard’s arguments are (...) targeted against views that hold that all it takes to manifest one’s cognitive agency is to properly exercise one’s belief-forming abilities. I offer an account of the notion of cognitive ability according to which our epistemic resources are not exhausted by abilities to produce true beliefs as outputs, but also include dispositions to stop belief-formation when actual or modal circumstances are not suitable for it (precautionary cognitive abilities). Knowledge, I argue, can be accordingly conceived as a cognitive success that is also due to the latter. The resulting version of robust virtue epistemology helps explain how purely modal facts as well as other agents’ cognitive abilities may have a bearing on the manifestation of one’s cognitive agency, which shows in turn that robust virtue epistemology and epistemic dependence are not incompatible after all. (shrink)

Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...) evidence exchange can go wrong, e.g., by exacerbating pre-existing biases, compromising the independence of individual judgments, etc., should the group simply take a vote without deliberating at all? While this question has multiple dimensions to it—including ethical and political dimensions—we approach the question through an epistemological lens. In particular, we investigate to what extent it is epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that groups whose members disagree over some issue use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach collective agreements. Extant approaches in the literature to this ‘deliberation versus voting’ comparison typically assume there is some univocal answer as to which group strategy is best, epistemically. We think this assumption is mistaken. We approach the deliberation versus voting question from a pluralist perspective, in that we hold that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different, albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, and epistemic justice. Different answers to our guiding question, we show, correspond with different epistemic goals. We conclude by exploring several ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation in relation to each epistemic goal. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier-style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that Freitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck.

Discussion about project management, in both the academic literature and industry, is predominantly based on theories of control, many of which have been developed since the 1950s. However, issues arise when these ideas are applied unilaterally to all types of projects and in all contexts. In complex environments, management problems arise from assuming that results, predicted at the start of a project, can be sufficiently described and delivered as planned. Thus, once a project reaches a critical size, a calendar, and (...) a certain level of ambiguity and interconnection, the analysis centered on control does not function adequately. Projects that involve complex situations can be described as adaptive complex systems, consistent in multiple interdependent dynamic components, multiple feedback processes, nonlinear relations, and management of hard data and soft data. In this study, through a complex network, the dynamic structure of a project and its trajectories are simulated using inference processes. Finally, some numerical simulations are described, leading to a decision making tool that identifies critical processes, thereby obtaining better performance outcomes of projects. (shrink)

From the analysis of the Wave 5 National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey 2021 dataset, the study conducted in South Africa, we developed a model of analysis based on three dimensions, namely, subjective well-being, material living conditions, and importance attributed to education during the COVID-19 pandemic. A cross-sectional analysis of the data for Gauteng area indicates that the dimension of subjective well-being of families in South Africa—even in relation to the factors such as conditions of deprivation —does (...) not necessarily influence the importance the respondents attach to their children’s education, this as reflected in whether or not they send them to school when COVID-19 restrictions allowed for schools to come back to face-to-face teaching. Subjective well-being of parents and guardians is, however, a predictor of concern about their children’s education and future. Our working hypothesis is that, although there is little evidence that subjective well-being has a significant association with the respondents’ willingness for their children to continue their schooling, there is a significant indirect effect of subjective well-being—which is especially determined by the gender as well as of the living material conditions—and the greater or lesser importance that the respondents attribute to their children’s education. Likewise, and in more general terms, subjective well-being is clearly related to gender, with women having the lowest levels of subjective well-being. (shrink)

La pregunta por la fe religiosa y sus posibilidades en el mundo moderno, suponen una determinada comprensión del ser humano. En efecto, dependiendo de cómo el hombre se comprenda a sí mismo será la manera que tenga de reconocer sus posibilidades hacia una experiencia creyente, y abrirse a la acogida de ella como una realidad posible y plausible. Esto es lo que entendió muy bien, desde el principio de su ministerio, el cardenal John Henry Newman. En efecto, la pregunta por (...) el ser humano, y sus consideraciones hacia la fe religiosa pasan a ser el eje central de su predicación anglicana. Este artículo muestra, bajo un estudio estadístico-heurístico, la centralidad temática de la predicación anglicana de Newman que acontece entre 1824 y 1843. The question of religious faith and its possibilities in the modern world supposes a particular understanding of being human. Indeed, depending on how man understands himself will influence how he recognizes his possibilities of a believing experience, and openness to this as a possible and plausible reality. This is what Cardinal John Henry Newman understood very well, from the beginning of his ministry. Undoubtedly, the question on being human and his considerations on religious faith became the centerpiece of his Anglican preaching. This article examines, as a statistical and heuristic study, the thematic centrality of Newman Anglican preaching between 1824 and 1843. (shrink)

Resumen La investigación pretende describir algunas influencias que las concepciones revolucionarias tuvieron en la Iglesia Católica chilena observadas en el análisis de las cartas pastorales de la Conferencia Episcopal entre los años 1960 y 1975. Por ello se elabora un marco teórico que permite caracterizar el concepto de revolución a partir del pensamiento de José Ortega y Gasset y de otros autores que complementan dicha visión, para luego aplicarlo a la realidad chilena de la segunda mitad del siglo veinte, periodo (...) en el que llegó al poder un gobierno que poseía un programa que en lo esencial contenía todos aquellos elementos que permiten, conforme el marco conceptual elaborado, denominarlo como revolucionario; y que además fue acompañado por partidos políticos que en sus congresos ideológicos defendieron las transformaciones institucionales, económicos y sociales de gran profundidad. Finalmente, se analizan los cambios que experimentó la Iglesia Católica durante la década de los sesenta del siglo veinte, expresado en términos de sus cartas pastorales, para luego señalar el modo en que la acción y el pensamiento revolucionario afectaron sus definiciones acerca de la realidad sociopolítica del país y la de su propia organización.This investigation intends to describe some of the influences that revolutionary notions had on the Catholic Church, as can observed in the analysis of the pastoral letters of the Bishop's Conference between 1960 and 1975. In order to do this, we have elaborated a theoretical framework that allows the portrayal of the concept of revolution through the thought of José de Ortega y Gasset, and of other authors that complement his views. Then we apply it to the Chilean situation in the second half of the 20th century. It was during this period that there came to power a government that had a program which, in essence, contained all those elements which, according to our framework, can be called revolutionary. It was also accompanied by political parties which, in their conventions proposed great institutional, economic and social transformation. Finally, we analyze the changes experienced by the Catholic Church during the 1960's, as it is expressed in pastoral letters, in order to point out the manner in which revolutionary thought and action influenced its pronouncements on the country's socio-political reality and also of its own structure. (shrink)

More and more studies and research have found a positive relationship between the participation of young people in altruistic activities and helping others, but it is interesting to discover a relationship of that personal and vocational satisfaction in the preparation and training in a profession as important to society as teaching. For students who begin university studies related to teaching, their psychological well-being and motivation towards this activity are very relevant aspects to consider. The access to and attainment of a (...) University Degree with a great vocational character, such as that of Pre-School Teacher or Primary Education Teacher, can benefit the students who will be in charge. These future educational professionals will have adequate motivation and maintain a psychological well-being that, in short, will favour their personal balance and will impact their future students. This research aims to analyse the degree of psychological well-being and its relationship with the motivation towards starting the teaching career. A sample of 233 students and students aged between 17 or 19 years of age who are beginning university studies at the School of Education of Ciudad Real was selected. All participants are enrolled in the first year of the Degree in Pre-school and Primary Education. The relationship between the psychological well-being of the students and their motivation towards attaining a professional teaching career was analysed. Other variables such as age or sex were also taken into account. A quantitative study was carried out and the Ryff Psychological Welfare Scale and the Intrinsic Motivation Questionnaire (IMI) were used. Once the results were analysed, it was observed that there is a positive correlation between the perception of psychological well-being that the participants have and their motivation towards the beginning of university studies, whose professional focus is mainly direct teaching with the students of the early stages of Pre-school and Primary Education. There are also some significant differences, considering the age and sex of the participants. The vocational character of university preparation for the teaching profession may determine that students who begin their Degree studies have an important motivation towards the performance of their professional future. (shrink)

According to Alan Millar, justified beliefs are well-founded beliefs. Millar cashes out the notion of well-foundedness in terms of having an adequate reason to believe something and believing it for that reason. To make his account of justified belief compatible with perceptual justification he appeals to the notion of recognitional ability. It is argued that, due to the fact that Millar’s is a knowledge-first view, his appeal to recognitional abilities fails to offer an explanatory account of familiar cases in the (...) literature and, as a consequence, of the notion of perceptual justification. (shrink)